In February 2024, the lyrics and video for the song “Macarena” by trap artist Erika Isac caused an amount of uproar in public debate. A feminist manifesto with a particular focus on sexual violence and the objectification of women, the clip did not shy away from foul language or implied nudity. It was followed by “Women in Parliament”, dealing with the issue of under-representation of women in politics and “Industry Plant”, addressing some of the criticism directed against “Macarena”.
2024 marks the biggest electoral year yet for Romania, with European, local, parliamentary and presidential polls scheduled to take place on the background of significant domestic and global challenges, with the potential to further destabilise and polarise society. The rise of far-right and right-wing populists, correlated with a surge of disinformation related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war, has reached an otherwise politically overlooked segment of the population – young people. Feeling unrepresented and severed from the political discourse, Romanian youth is at significant risk of radicalisation, being particularly vulnerable to extremist voices that aim to capitalise on their frustrations and disengagement, while leveraging their preferred channels of information and communication with increasing efficiency. Social media and youth susceptibility to online echo chambers and influencers provide pathway for manipulation by malicious actors whose political agenda aligns – more often than not – with the Kremlin’s (anti-EU, anti-NATO, anti-Ukraine, pro-Russia).
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has opened a new front for disinformation and propaganda, to which Romania, both an EU and NATO member, has not been immune. The spread of anti-EU and anti-West narratives, typically in line with the Kremlin’s agenda, or even openly pro-Kremlin, has been a part of the Romanian public discourse and media landscape for years.
Despite the rise of TikTok and discussions about “freer” platforms such as MeWe or Telegram, Facebook remains the main platform for political debates in Romania. Facebook is also the platform for initiating radicalization. Radical channels on Facebook work to attract people with moderate opinions or those who are not politically socialized online, radicalize them, and then try to transfer them to other platforms.
In this – apparently favourable – environment, Diana Șoșoacă, far-right MP and outspoken Kremlin supporter, has experienced a spectacular drop in audience, from 22 million monthly views to mere thousands in just a few months.
An analysis of 4,741 public pages populating Romania’s Facebook universe has revealed that the rather limited influence of overt pro-Russian outlets in Romania has not discouraged the Kremlin from speculating local, like-minded individuals and organisations in promoting a divisive narrative targeting mainly our trans-Atlantic orientation and EU membership.
Between 1 – 24 November 2019, GlobalFocus Center, in cooperation with MEMO 98, monitored 102 public Facebook accounts of political parties, candidates, politicians, media, and other influential actors involved in the presidential election. Analysis observed 168 posts dedicated to disinformation in relation to the presidential elections by various accounts, especially by media and influencers.