September 2024
This report has been prepared with support from IRI’s Beacon Project. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect those of IRI.
Executive summary
Public opinion and politics. For many years, Romania has been considered safe from Russian influence due to the long-standing suspicions the people and elites alike harbour against Russian imperialism. Nevertheless, this strong point has been heavily eroded in recent years as far right parties have prospered at the polls and in elections. The AUR party has a more evasive pro-Russian stance while SOS has an openly pro-Russian position. Together they have around 20% in polls. Both parties have exceeded the electoral threshold in elections for the EU Parliament and are trying to leverage momentum for the parliamentary and presidential elections this year.
Legal Framework. The existing legal framework has developed incrementally due to crises like the COVID pandemic and the Russian invasion in Ukraine. While it offers instruments to combat FIMI, it does not always mandate institutions to do so. The interest to develop this framework is contingent on crises and pressures from abroad. Lacking that, political decision-makers, the media, and civil society tend to show less concern for fighting FIMI and more concern for avoiding the appearance of infringing upon human rights.
Institutional Coordination. The Supreme Defence Council is expected to coordinate fighting FIMI as a threat to national security; Romania’s Defence Strategy provides, to an extent, guidelines. However, the coordination appears to be limited to the security establishment and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while other state institutions may choose to contribute or not. Also, the relevant concepts and definitions are not always synchronized between institutions which may lead to difficulties in coordination. In previous Global Focus research decision-makers and specialists from state institutions have complained of the lack of a unifying strategic communication document – a Strategy for Strategic Communication has been in the works but it was never published
Support to Ukraine. Due to recent historical events, mainstream political elites fear that discussing publicly the support for Ukraine would make them vulnerable to attacks from the far right. There is, or at least there was in early 2022, a temptation for mainstream actors to borrow anti-Ukraine arguments and attitudes from the rhetoric of the far right.
Beyond the expected wartime fatigue, there is no
significant indication that popular support for Ukraine is significantly turning.
Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that in a Eurobarometer survey,
Romanians declared that they prefer price stability to defending shared
European values. As a consequence, it is of great importance that support for
Ukraine is not constructed in public discourse as being a source of poverty for
the people.
Recommendations
- Go large: Combating threats cannot be limited to the security establishment and bureaucratic class. It should embrace a whole-society strategy to harness as many resources as possible and build resilience wherever attacks may occur.
- If you want the bureaucracy to contribute effectively to FIMI, you need to spell it out. Make clear that mandates are imperative rather than optional. Spell out the mandates clearly and ensure definitions and concepts are consistent across the board. This should occur at the national level for member-states, but the European Union could also play a crucial role in onboarding candidate states to a common framework.
- Build trust and address fears through good governance. FIMI often targets fears. Politicians should seek to diminish fears by understanding their legitimate core and alleviating them through good governance and proper communication.
- Do not copy the illiberal far-right. Do not borrow from extremist discourses, thinking you can attract far-right votes. Most often, people prefer the original over the copy.
- Do not make the European Union the scapegoat for unpopular political decisions and reforms. It only adds to the conspiracy narratives.
- Build upon the European identity: Cautiously build upon European pride and identity to enhance solidarity between citizens of different states.
- Continue to regulate and monitor the activity of social networks particularly given the arrival of Large Language Models. Also, make sure that large social networks provide accurate and timely data for institutions that research and combat FIMI.
- Invest in media literacy. It will not change much on the short term but it is crucial for long term resilience.
Legal framework
In Romania, given that historically the vast majority of Romanians have a critical view of Russia, most concerns about inappropriate influences on the public space have been focused on internal actors. The first institutions with a role in this direction, such as the National Audiovisual Council (which has responsibilities regarding disinformation in TV and radio) or the National Council for Combating Discrimination (which has responsibilities regarding hate speech), were specifically designed for internal actors, even if in their activity they can also combat influence from external sources.
In this context, political officials, the mass media and civil society have generally been reluctant to develop legislation against disinformation and external interference, fearing that it could violate the right to free expression or that it could negatively interfere with their own political or, in the case of the press, economic interests.
It was only after the 2020 pandemic and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine that a new concern for developing FIMI legislation emerged, partly as a result of international pressures, resulting in new laws and regulations.
However, these tend to be in the area of national security, which, according to Romanian practice, means that the main institutions with an enforcement role will be military or semi-militarized[1] (Romanian Intelligence Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of National Defence) or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The securitization of combating disinformation and foreign interference makes it impossible to adopt and implement a whole of society strategy, which would allow the maximal use of information and expertise existing at the societal level.
Regulation that speaks more strongly about proactive measures is still needed. A National Strategic Communication Strategy was developed under the coordination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at the request of the European Union, but it was never published. Further regulation exists within the security establishment and under the coordination of the Supreme Council of National Defence (the forum that brings together the main security decision-makers) but these are not public.
Also, employees in military and semi-militarized institutions, are reluctant to carry out strategic communication without a clear and explicit mandate from the civilian power. Partly, this reluctance is of a constitutional nature, under the principle of subordination of the army to civilian control. But the “lack of mandate” cand also be invoked as an excellent cover for those bureaucrats who prefer not to have a proactive approach to communication.
Securitization can create and, to some extent, is already creating opposition from the media and civil society. Moreover, politicians can use the securitisation of strategic communication as an excuse to move public policy to institutions that are naturally less transparent in order to avoid responsibility.
Role of Parliament. The Romanian Parliament does not have an outstanding specified role in fighting against FIMI. It does have a legal role in general legislating (thus impacting FIMI) and general control of the secret services, which may be involved in fighting against FIMI.
Relevant parliamentary committees[2] may include: Committees on Culture, Arts, Media[i] [ii] (dealing generally with the public sphere of information), Committees on Defence, Public Order and National Security[iii] [iv] (for aspects pertaining to national security), Committees on Human Rights[v] [vi] (for protecting the citizen’s rights in the context of the fight against FIMI), Committees on Information and Communication Technology[vii] [viii] (for cybersecurity) and the Joint Permanent Committee of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate for the exercise of parliamentary control over the activity of SRI [the Romanian Intelligence Service][ix]. Customarily all legislation is seen by the Judicial Committee of each of the two Chambers before being subjected to vote.
Legal Timeline
| 1968 | Art. 168 of the Penal Code[x] criminalizes the distribution of false information threatening the security of the state |
| 2004[xi] | Law. 535 for combatting terrorism authorizes ANCOM (the Romanian telecommunications authority) to block channels of information at the request of the Romanian Intelligence Service if they “incite to commit a terrorist act or promotes ideas, concepts, doctrines or attitudes in order to support the cause/activities of terrorist entities”. The utility of this law to FIMI is limited at best due its narrow domain. |
| 2009 | Art 404 of the (new) Penal Code[xii] criminalizes the knowing dissemination of false information that undermines national security. It is an updated form of Art 168. The article is hard to apply due to vague definitions and the difficulty of proving awareness of the falsehood. It has never been applied (to our knowledge) and its application could generate controversy and criticism from civil society. |
| 2019 | A legislative proposal for defining and combatting disinformation does not get to a final vote. |
| 2020 | Presidential decree 195, issued during a state of emergency, authorises the telecommunication agency (ANCOM) to deny or limit access to [purveyors of] fake news related to the COVID pandemic[xiii]. The decree creates a precedent that can be used in future states of emergency. The methodology for identifying fake news channels was never published |
| 2020 | Romania’s National Security Strategy includes clear provisions on combating FIMI. The strategy is implemented mainly by “security” institution (Ministries of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defence, intelligence services) and the Ministry for External Affairs. |
| 2022 | Romania, together with the rest of the European Union, bans RT and Sputnik, and, then, a few Romanian sites. The telecommunication agency in charge with this (ANCOM) invokes[xiv] rights give through Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council[xv] |
| 2023 | Cyberdefence Law[xvi] establishes “propaganda or disinformation campaigns that affect the constitutional order” as threats to national security. |
| 2024 | Draft law on deepfakes promotes the “responsible use of technology” to combat disinformation through deepfakes but is criticized by civil society as following a “Chinese model)[xvii] |
The Romanian case: setting the scene
The importance of FIMI and the need for strategic communication to combat it became more evident in Romania since the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.
In the initial stages of the pandemic, Romania, similar to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe[xviii], took firm measures to control the spread of the virus, leading to lower infection and mortality rates than in Western Europe. Although there was not necessarily a single communication centre, the attention of the media naturally focused on Raed Arafat, the head of the Department for Emergency Situations and an experienced communicator who became a single point of contact
Soon, however, the situation degenerated. Several politicians, including the prime minister and the health minister, were caught by the press not respecting the protocols imposed by the government for protection, which created in the minds of citizens a legitimate doubt about the confidence that these politicians have in their own measures. At the same time, official communication was transferred to a trio of communicators coordinated by the spokesperson of the Army, and “guided” by an elusive Communication Coordination Committee made up of the spokespersons of an unspecified number of institutions.
The effects of this poor strategic political communication have been and continue to be critical for the level of vulnerability that Romania has in the face of external threats.
In the short term, trust in protection measures and a vaccine decreased, leading to a significant increase in infection and mortality rates[xix].
At the same time, politicians and influencers such as George Simion, a militant for the unification of Romania with the Republic of Moldova, or Diana Șoșoacă, the controversial lawyer of the Orthodox Archdiocese of Tomis, actively promoted COVID conspiracy theories. On this basis, they built notoriety and credibility. Simion founded the far-right party AUR (Alliance for the Union of Romanians), together with Claudiu Târziu, a denier of the crimes of Romanian interwar fascists, and the aforementioned Diana Șoșoacă. The party, which has its message aligned with the Kremlin’s narratives, surprisingly obtained 9% in the 2020 parliamentary elections[xx]. After a while, Diana Șoșoacă formed her own party, SOS, with an even more explicit pro-Russian orientation. Together, the two parties won 20% in the 2024 European elections[xxi] and are projected to have a similar score in the parliamentary and presidential elections in the same year[3]. Against the background of the strong fragmentation of traditional parties and the decline in general trust in the political class, we cannot exclude the possibility that a representative of the far right will enter the second round of the 2024 presidential elections.
According to a study conducted by Global Focus in 2023[xxii] and direct observations made by Global Focus in relation to actors involved in the effort to help Ukrainian refugees, the strong internal and external anti-vaccine propaganda during the epidemic and the surge of extremist pro-Russian parties led to mainstream actors (politicians, civil servants and civic activists) becoming intimidated. They mis-learned [4]from these events that there is a strong conservative and conspiratorial inclination in the Romanian population that can be activated at any time. This intimidation contributed, along with other political calculations, to the low profile of the communication of politicians, but also of civic actors, regarding the aid granted to Ukraine as a state and to Ukrainian refugees in Romania.
Main FIMI external actors
In Romania, the Kremlin is the main external vector of disinformation narratives. Russia, itself, has a very low popularity in Romania and generates rather worry and fear, according to all available polls. Therefore, the Russian strategy, to the extent that it can be observed , is not one of bringing Russia closer to Romania, but rather of undermining the Romanians’ trust in democracy, liberal values, mainstream politics and external alliances, thus promoting the destabilization and weakening of the country.
Therefore, explicitly pro-Russian narratives are relatively few and not among the most popular. Instead, toxic actors align themselves with Russian positions / narratives that are ultra-conservative, anti-liberal, anti-NATO, anti-Ukraine and fearmongering. Explicitly pro-Russian narratives are mainly promoted by the far-right party SOS of lawyer Diana Șoșoacă.
Another more reserved promoter of similar ideas is the People’s Republic of China, which generally aligns itself with Russia’s communication points. However, China’s influence on the general population is low, as its strategic option is to deal directly with political elites.
An atypical source of external influence are some evangelical organizations[5] that support “neo-Protestant[6]” denominations in Romania and their ultra-conservative and anti-liberal politics. The global rapprochement between some evangelical circles and the conservative-Orthodox circles close to Vladimir Putin was seen in the joint participation in the meetings organized or sponsored by the “World Congress of Families” (WCF) held in Moscow[xxiii], Budapest[xxiv] (2017) and Chisinau[xxv] (2018). WCF is considered by the Southern Poverty Law Center to be an anti-LGBT+ organization[xxvi].
In Romania, neo-Protestant conservative circles have approached conservative circles in the Romanian Orthodox Church and worked together in campaigns that led to a controversial referendum in Romania in 2018, where they attempted, and failed, to establish heterosexual marriage as a constitutional norm.
Finally, the Hungarian governing FIDESZ party exerts influence on the positions of UDMR/RMDSZ the party representing the Hungarian minority in Romania, as shown by recent research by Political Capital[xxvii]. Hungarian PM Viktor Orban himself is also seen as a model by some Romanian nationalists who are traditionally hostile to Hungary, but who admire in him a leader whom they perceive to be dedicated to his people. Orban has tried, and to some extent succeeded, to use his annual participation in the summer school in Băile Tușnad to promote illiberal and racist messages[xxviii].
In Romania, messages produced by these sources are cautiously taken up by far-right politicians and influencers. This is a paradox because neither Russia, nor Hungary were previously popular among the Romanian far right, which normally claims roots in the interwar anti-Russian Fascism and in the Communist xenophobic nationalism.
Main narratives
For this report, the main external influence narratives were divided into categories: (1) narratives related to health and the COVID pandemic, (2) narratives related to the war in Ukraine, (3) narratives related to the European Union and Romania’s Western allies, and (4) ultraconservative / illiberal narratives.
Health-related narratives are generally highly critical of public health policies, especially those during COVID, including travel restrictions and mandatory vaccination. These are expressed as radical conspiracy narratives (vaccines and restrictions are harmful to health and were promoted for hidden purposes which may include population control), moderate / skeptical conspiracy narratives (vaccines and restrictions are ineffective and promoted due to economic interests) and libertarian anti-state narratives (everyone has the right to decide for themselves, no one is obliged to take into account the health of those around them).
Narratives related to the war in Ukraine are generally anti-Ukrainian rather than pro-Russian, manoeuvring around the hostility and fear that the majority of the Romanian population feels towards Russia. These narratives include….
(a) classic themes of Russian propaganda, such as the fact that Russia was provoked by NATO, Ukraine or the European Union. These narratives are not particularly successful in Romania.
(b) repurposed older themes of Romanian nationalism and the far right. These include the idea that Ukraine is not a natural friend of Romania due to historical territorial disputes, as well as due to the allegedly discriminatory treatment that Ukraine has towards Romanians and Romanian speakers in Ukraine. The grievances behind these narratives are, to some extent, common between the far right and mainstream political discourse in Romania, but the pro-Russian far right expresses them in a stronger anti-Ukrainian form, linking aid given to Ukraine to the disappearance of any disagreements with Ukraine and ignoring the tradition of finding solutions through dialogue and arbitration[7].
(c) anti-Western and, in particular, anti-European discourse. Much of this anti-European discourse in recent years has targeted Europe’s support for Ukraine. The pro-Russian far right has argued that Europe supports Ukraine to the detriment of Romania’s interests at the pressure of the EU, NATO, occult forces or specific EU countries. It has also been argued that EU/NATO/Western support against Putin is weak and Eastern countries like Romania will not be protected against Russia if it invades.
Other criticisms of the European Union concern EU intervention in food (Codex Alimentarius, allowing the use of cricket flour) and the emphasis on minority rights, especially sexual ones (“woke-ism”).
(d) ultra-conservative[8] and illiberal narratives. These focus on an anti-LGBT+ agenda and accusations of woke-ism but, occasionally, an may include an anti-environment agenda as seen in the promotion of diesel over electric cars.
These messages take advantage of insufficient strategic communication and the relative lack of transparency on the part of the Romanian government, as well as the presence/acceptability in mainstream discourse of a level of nationalism and anti-European populism. Generally, the most successful of them manage to promote fear (fear of invasion, fear of insufficient stocks (in the early months of the war), of inflation, of economic instability). By comparison, more ideologically driven narratives tend to arouse less interest.
Message overlap. The ultra-conservative message is the common glue that unites most of the foreign actors mentioned above both with each other and with the far-right forces in Romania. This overlap can be seen in the alliance to support the consecration of the heterosexual family in the Constitution. It included, among others, conservative Romanian Orthodox clergy in Eastern Romania (Moldavia and Dobrudja) harbouring some sympathies for Putin’s conservatism, neo-protestants supported by Evangelical Christians from USA[xxix] and Hungarian Protestant/Catholic Churches[xxx] which are supported financially from Hungary,.
During the COVID pandemic, there was roughly the same overlap external of actors, with the important note that Viktor Orban’s regime did not dispute the existence of COVID, but imported vaccines that were not evaluated for the European market, coming from Russia and China.
Regarding the narratives related to the war in Ukraine, we again have an overlap between the aforementioned actors and the far-right politicians and influencers in Romania. Finally, criticism of the European Union expressed in populist and conspiratorial terms is also found in the messages of the aforementioned actors.
What is next
The main danger in the information space is represented by the normalization of radical narratives, which can take two forms. On the one hand, there is the risk of mainstreaming of discourses of the radical right, especially anti-Ukrainian, nationalist and conservative ones, which could be adopted by the main parties in the hope of attracting voters from the radical right. Such an effort was made at the beginning of 2023, when prominent personalities from the governing coalition (between Social Democrats and National Liberals) criticized Ukraine and Austria, using potentially legitimate grievances, but dressed in a language that was more reminiscent of the values of the far right than of liberal values.[xxxi] These lines of discourse were later abandoned, but remain a potential danger.
On the other hand, there is a risk of further radicalisation of parts of the far right, through the normalization of pro-Russian discourse. Thus, openly supporting the Kremlin would transition from the fringes towards the centre of the far right. At the moment, the direct use of pro-Russian narratives remains problematic, even within the far right, due to the complicated history between the two countries, but also due to the fact that part of the far right is inspired from the anti-Russian positions of interwar fascism and post-war national communism. But the emergence of SOS, an explicitly pro-Russian party that passed the electoral threshold in the 2024 European elections and sent two MEPs to the European Parliament, proves that there can be a politically viable pro-Russian discourse within the far right. For the presidential elections, the main far-right party, AUR, may have to turn to SOS for support; it remains to be seen to what extent this possible alliance will lead to the adoption of a more open pro-Russian discourse.
Another significant danger is that the pro-Russian far right would succeed in connecting its anti-Ukrainian discourse to the problems of the population, as they are seen in polls. A Eurobarometer published in the first part of 2023 showed that Romania, like Hungary, prefers price stability to the detriment of defending European values[xxxii]. Although they have tried in some cases (for example, when speaking of the price of energy and the supply of wheat), AUR and SOS, have not managed to make this connection believable outside their own supporters. If they succeed this with future narratives, it could lead to a rapid deterioration of the support offered by the Romanian population to the war effort in Ukraine and, possibly, of the support offered to refugees.
Another family of narratives that could grow in the public space are ultra-conservative and anti-climate. Even while the main far-right leaders are showpeople rather than ideologues, the rank and file of the party does harbour real, ideological ultraconservatives and extremists that will continue to push their agenda forward. For the anti-climate narratives, the main danger is their instrumentalization in local politics as a discursive instrument directed against mayors who would like to limit car traffic and increase green space in their cities.
Artificial intelligence. The proliferation of artificial intelligence and, in particular, of large language models poses new and difficult to quantify challenges in terms of FIMI.
From what can be observed so far, the main trend is the democratization of access to tools that can be used for attacks. Almost everything that can be done with artificial intelligence could be done before, but at a higher cost. Thus, artificial intelligence allows the appearance of a larger amount of disinformation messages, as well as a much larger amount of audio and video disinformation materials.
In the opinion of the author of this report, the fundamental dynamics are not necessarily affected. For example, print screen materials are often used in investigations and, although they can be extremely easily falsified, this is not usually considered to be a major threat or a major facilitator of disinformation. However, AI can create a wider gap between those with high media literacy, who will be able to assess (more) correctly the veracity of the information they receive an those with low media literacy, who will not.
In addition, as shown by a recent report by the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence[xxxiii] artificial intelligence can be used not only for messages but also for identifying and targeting vulnerable categories of the population.
To counter these dangers, regulation of artificial intelligence to prevent abuse may be necessary, but it will never be 100% effective. Media and information literacy programs for children and adults are essential, so that they become armed with the necessary skills to distinguish truth from falsehood.
We must also keep pace in the AI arms race. As fringe actors gain access to increasingly powerful tools, the access to quality data of actors involved in countering FIMI must also be increased. In this sense, the Digital Services Act imposes a series of transparency obligations on platform providers, but it is not clear to what extent the EU has the political will to enforce these obligations, as seen in the indifference with which the termination of the Meta Craowdtangle analysis platform was received.
What is missing in the response to FIMI
In Romania,
The current legislation allows, but does not necessarily require institutions, especially civilian ones, to carry out activities to combat FIMI. In some cases, the lack of an imperative mandate to engage in activities against FIMI can lead to delayed action or even inaction. Also missing is a better coordination of definitions and strategies. From 2023 research quoted earlier, it emerged that several government communicators feel the need for a formal coordination document on strategic communication.
Institutionally, there is a lack of commitment to a whole-of-society strategy. In this context, we are not only referring to the drafting of a formal strategic document; major obstacles include the securitization and, to some extent, the bureaucratization of combating FIMI, as well as the lack of trust between state institutions and civil society/citizens.
At the societal level, repeated surveys show that Romanians have low interpersonal trust[xxxiv], as well as low trust in institutions. This makes cooperation against FIMI very difficult. Trust in the European Union has also declined in 2020[9], which has allowed the emergence of Eurosceptic parties like AUR and SOS.
As a form of added context, the cultural specificity of the Romanian Communist regime was the compensation of the lack of reform through extensive propaganda, one of the most pervasive in Central and Eastern Europe. As a result of this period, there is a certain systemic distrust of the population towards official narratives and the belief that there is always something “left unsaid.” In some scenarios, this is an advantage for the resilience against propaganda used in FIMI. In other scenarios this attitude leads to low trust in authorities and increased vulnerability to conspiracy theories.
In the European Union …
… the problem of combating FIMI is of a more delicate nature. On the one hand, the threats are not strictly confined within the borders of one nation or another but present pan-European strategies and tactics that, therefore, require coordination of response at the European level. On the other hand, these threats take specific national forms depending the language and culture of each state and are perceived as attacks on national states and societies; thus, the population’s expectation for a response to these attacks is primarily directed towards national governments.
Institutionally, what the European Union lacks is a more effective coordination leading to a similar understanding of threats between nations, as well as a coordinated response. Also, although the European Union has indicated through various regulatory acts that it desires better regulation of the cyber space, it is not clear that the Union has sufficient political will and agility to produce and, more importantly, operationalize the application of these regulations[10].
At the societal level, there is a lack of that kind of solidarity that can make a citizen in one country feel affected by threats and hostile actions occurring in another country. This is a classic problem of the European Union, which relates to its status as an embodiment of the transition between national states (on the one hand) and an integrated and polity. Inevitably, the European Union has some of the characteristics of national states, including a political framework oriented towards the principles of democracy, without having the solidary “demos” that accompanied the emergence of national states.
Conclusions and recommendations
Russia’s strategic objectives in Romania are to increase distrust within society, between society and government, and between Romania and its allies. This would make Romania a less reliable member of NATO and the European Union, thus furthering Russia’s long-term objectives.
Simultaneously, China and Fidesz, the Hungarian ruling party, are occasionally relevant actors. China focuses on elite persuasion, relying on long-standing contacts dating from the Communist era, while the Fidesz uses Hungarian ethnics in Romania for its internal political goals. The two actors are a lesser threat, but their strategies and narratives often align with and support the Kremlin’s general objectives.
Romania’s assets in combating FIMI nclude a will to follow EU and NATO regulations and efforts, a general distrust of Russia, as well as by the gradual liberalization of society and the lack of violent incidents motivated by political, ethnic, or other exclusionary reasons. On the other hand, the country suffers from a general lack of trust, whether interpersonal or between institutions and citizens. Objectives causes for concern, including the pandemics, the war in Ukraine and high inflation add to the pressure felt by society.
Against this background, governmental strategic communication directed towards the public, both on FIMI-related issues and other topics, has generally been insufficient.
Together the factors above contributed to the rise of far-right pro-Russia parties like AUR and SOS. SOS, in particular, is a reason for concern, being the first explicitly pro-Russia viable political force since the 1989 Revolution. AUR is an anti-Ukraine party that has been declared at least once in a court of law to be pro-Russian[xxxv] but generally prefers anti-Ukraine messages to explicitly pro-Russian ones.
After the COVID pandemic and particularly after the start of the war in Ukraine, Romania’s concern with countering disinformation has increased, resulting in new legislation. However, due to the securitization of the issue and the general bureaucratic approach, Romanian authorities do not have yet a comprehensive whole-of-society approach towards countering disinformation.
Part of the problem is also insufficient political will, as mainstream politicians are tempted to adopt themes and messages from the Russia-aligned far-right and incorporate them into their own messaging, in the mistaken hope that they will recover some of the electorate they lost.
Recommendations
At the institutional and legal level, Romania should embrace a whole-of-society strategy to combat FIMI by moving beyond the securitization of the issue and replacing a formal approach with transparency and openness to civil society and other stakeholders. For the state to act coherently within this strategy, further clarification of the concepts and terms used is necessary. Compliance at various bureaucratic levels could be enhanced by clarifying an imperative, rather than optional, mandate for institutions to contribute effectively.
At the political level, actors should build up the political will to achieve these purposes. This includes isolating pro-Russian-aligned actors and discourses on the political scene. Stronger communication and transparency are crucial so that citizens feel informed and empowered, reducing the temptation to turn to fringe actors or manipulated discourses.
Beyond the scope of this paper, we know that vulnerabilities to FIMI are deeply rooted in psychological emotions, with fear oftentimes playing a central role. While information can alleviate some fears, on an emotional level, the opposite of fear is hope, and hope can be sustained in the medium and long term only through good governance properly communicated.
At the European level, the Union should stop accepting blame from national politicians who want or need to promote unpopular reforms. Pressure should be put on governments undertaking such reforms to take responsibility and clearly explain to their respective nations the reasoning behind them, rather than blaming the European Union.
The European Union should contribute more strongly to a coherent set of definitions and practices related to FIMI. For example, during accession negotiations with Ukraine, Moldova, or other countries, the EU should insist that such definitions and practices be adopted as part of the Acquis Communautaire.
Finally, the European
Union should encourage solidarity between European nations by working to
fortify elements of European identity where possible. This is a delicate task,
as the European identity sometimes is seen as opposing national identities.
Nevertheless, the EU can promote European pride by showing how the desire to
join and assume EU values motivates many Ukrainians to fight and die.
Additionally, the EU should emphasize that Europeans, whether within or outside
the Union, are collectively threatened by the resurgence of imperialist and
revisionist forces, exemplified by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Endnotes
[1] “Semi-militarised” institutions that have military-like hierarchies, ranks and sometimes weapons and uniforms, typically in the security and civil defence establishment.
[2] Romania has a bicameral Parliament. For brevity, the names of committees were “standardised” to a common form, even though they may vary slightly from Chamber to Chamber.
[3] Presidential elections will be held on November 24th, 2024 (first round) and December 8th, 2024 (second round) Parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held on December 1st 2024, which is also Romania’s National Holiday.
[4] In Romanian academic literature, AUR is alternatively seen either as a far-right ideology-driven party or as a populist / anti-elitist party. In our analysis, AUR’s appeal is not overwhelmingly ideological but rather, like many other far-right populist parties, it capitalizes on the frustrations of Romanians faced with current challenges, including inflation, fears of invasion, lack of governmental communication and transparency. Although AUR is still insufficiently studied, it is important to note that the increase in AUR/SOS votes do not appear to be correlated with any other kind of societal radicalization of behaviour. On the contrary, we see a continued lack of violent hate incidents, whether ethnic or sexual, a more open attitude towards Ukrainian refugees compared to the attitude towards Syrian refugees in the past, and an increase in the number and attendance of Pride marches.
[5] There is little information about this but in 2018, during the referendum for mentioning the heterosexual family in the Constitution organisations like, Liberty Counsel (https://lc.org/ ) and ADF International (https://adfinternational.org/our-model#international-engagement) became known for their support. ADF International is also active in Brussels offering legal advice for a range of ultraconservative and Christian fundamentalist causes.
[6] Pentecostals, Baptists and Plymouth Brethren (ro: “Creștini după Evanghelie”) are a relatively recent addition to Romanian Christianity and are called neo-protestants to differentiate them from the traditional denominations hailing from the original Reform in Transylvania in the 16th century. Churchgoers tend to be more conservative than the general public and the churches have connections with American Evangelical Christians, receiving aid and know-how.
[7] Romania tends to benefit from dialogues and international arbitrage on disputed issues: it has received most of the plateau around Serpent Island in International Courts, has been able to block some of the developments on Bystroye Canal due to environmental concerns and has negotiated (future) improvements in the situation of Romanian speaking minorities in Ukraine
[8] The ultra-conservative label is applied to public policy requirements and proposals that fundamentally contradict the liberal values included in the Constitution and in treaties signed by Romania.
[9] It is now recovering https://www.rfi.fr/ro/rom%C3%A2nia/20240620-romania-incredere-presa
[10] An example in this
regard is the replacement of Meta’s social listening tool with tools with more
restricted access and lower quality. This replacement was made under conditions
where the DSA aimed for increased data transparency for researchers.
[i] https://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.co?idc=10
[ii] https://www.senat.ro/Comisie_new.aspx?Zi&ComisieID=4df04d25-923c-4140-95e3-fa8073da8c6e
[iii] https://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.co?idc=12
[iv] https://www.senat.ro/Comisie_new.aspx?Zi&ComisieID=4f215fcc-57dd-48e1-ade9-a7fe8f3b9533#
[v] https://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.co?idc=5
[vi] https://www.senat.ro/Comisie_new.aspx?Zi&ComisieID=b9bd4c73-77c2-4a3b-a3be-0c011bd5b2c8
[vii] https://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.co?idc=19
[viii] https://www.senat.ro/Comisie_new.aspx?Zi&ComisieID=9e8b427f-6d7f-45e3-a2be-85582fa1410c
[ix] https://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.co?idc=15&cam=0&poz=1
[x] https://lege5.ro/Gratuit/heydinrt/art-1681-comunicarea-de-informatii-false-codul-penal?dp=giztonzwge4da
[xi] https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocumentAfis/57494
[xii] https://legeaz.net/noul-cod-penal/art-404.
[xiii] https://hotnews.ro/cum-ar-putea-fi-blocate-site-urile-de-propaganda-rusa-guvernul-nu-a-anuntat-baza-legala-iar-continutul-este-nca-disponibil-142835
[xiv] https://hotnews.ro/cum-ar-putea-fi-blocate-site-urile-de-propaganda-rusa-guvernul-nu-a-anuntat-baza-legala-iar-continutul-este-nca-disponibil-142835
[xv] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/2120/oj
[xvi] https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocument/265677
[xvii] https://romania.europalibera.org/a/legea-deepfake-copie-chinezeasca/32817335.html
[xviii] https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2023.11.08.23298275v1.full
[xix] https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/romania/
[xx] https://prezenta.roaep.ro/parlamentare06122020/romania-pv-final
[xxi] https://results.elections.europa.eu/ro/rezultate-nationale/romania/2024-2029/
[xxii] https://www.global-focus.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Is-Romania-ready-to-combat-disinformation-and-communicate-effectively-1.pdf
[xxiii] https://profam.org/wcf-conferences-and-events
[xxiv] https://inliniedreapta.net/bogdan-stanciu-lista-lui-dughin-reprezinta-coalitia-pentru-familie-la-congresul-mondial-al-familiilor-de-la-budapesta
[xxv] https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/pregatiri-pentru-congresul-familiei-traditionale/29484149.html
[xxvi] link https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/world-congress-families
[xxvii] https://politicalcapital.hu/news.php?article_read=1&article_id=3311
[xxviii] https://vsquare.org/nazi-viktor-orban-mixed-race-speech-hungary-baile-tusnad-tusvanyos-festival/)
[xxix] https://www.global-focus.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Propaganda-Made-to-Measure-How-Our-Vulnerabilities-Facilitate-Russian-Influence.pdf p 106
[xxx] https://pressone.ro/cu-ce-se-mai-ocupa-zilele-astea-liderii-coalitiei-pentru-familie
[xxxi] https://www.global-focus.eu/2023/02/pro-russian-voices-legitimised-in-the-context-of-romanian-ukrainian-tensions-on-minorities-in-bukovina/ see also: https://www.global-focus.eu/2023/02/extremists-go-to-town-case-study-on-the-overlap-and-cooperation-between-fringe-and-mainstream-media
[xxxii] https://www.global-focus.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Energy-Report.pdf. For cultural reasons, concepts such as defending European values may appear too pompous for the ordinary citizen and it is not impossible that this aspect influences the results.
[xxxiii] https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/ai-in-precision-persuasion-unveiling-tactics-and-risks-on-social-media/309
[xxxiv] https://hotnews.ro/ncrederea-n-oameni-si-participarea-la-boicoturi-n-rndul-romnilor-la-cote-printre-cele-mai-joase-n-ue-sondaj-european-10796
[xxxv] https://defapt.ro/judecatorii-au-decis-ca-putem-spune-ca-aur-face-propaganda-pro-rusa-jurnalista-ioana-constantin-a-castigat-definitiv-procesul-cu-partidul-lui-george-simion/
